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Journal of Theoretical Politics
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What's this?

Relevance of Voting Power

Jan-Erik Lane

Sven Berg

Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.

Key Words: constitutional analysis • cooperative game theory • power index method • power modalities

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 309-320 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003002
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