This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Garrett, G. Articles by Tsebelis, G. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union

George Tsebelis

Jan-Erik Lane and Sven Berg, and Manfred Holler and Mika Widgrén, agree that power index analysis of the EU cannot take into account its institutional structure. For us, this is a sufficient condition for its failure as a research program. Nonetheless, they go on to argue that power indices are better suited than our analysis to address questions of institutional design under conditions of uncertainty. We demonstrate, however, that the way they model uncertainty (outcomes are uniformly distributed across the possible `states of the world') means that their conclusions depend heavily on the partition of these states of the world. As a result, power-index-based analyses of institutional design are not informed by the factors that should be included (institutions and strategies) and instead rely on a priori mathematical formulas and analysts' questionable assumptions about the partition of future states of the world.

Key Words: agenda-setting • European integration • European Union • legislative processes • power indices

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 331-338 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003004


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				D. Junge and T. Konig What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?: The Accuracy and Robustness of Empirical Applications To the Interpretation of the Legislative Process and the Specification of Preferences Journal of Theoretical Politics, October 1, 2007; 19(4): 465 - 487. [Abstract] [PDF]

				J. B. Slapin Who Is Powerful?: Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences European Union Politics, March 1, 2006; 7(1): 51 - 76. [Abstract] [PDF]

				M. Braham and M. J. Holler The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index Journal of Theoretical Politics, January 1, 2005; 17(1): 137 - 157. [Abstract] [PDF]

				S. Napel and M. Widgren Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis: A Unified Approach Journal of Theoretical Politics, October 1, 2004; 16(4): 517 - 538. [Abstract] [PDF]

				D. S. Felsenthal and M. Machover Myths and Meanings of Voting Power: Comments on a Symposium Journal of Theoretical Politics, January 1, 2001; 13(1): 81 - 97. [Abstract] [PDF]

				G. Garrett and G. Tsebelis Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU Journal of Theoretical Politics, January 1, 2001; 13(1): 99 - 105. [PDF]