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Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency

Past and Present Institutions of Governance in Pacific Northwest Salmon Fisheries

The article explores three interrelated questions related to institutional design: the roles of states and communities in creating and maintaining institutions designed to resolve commons problems arising from the use of natural resource systems; the substantive content of such institutions with respect to allocative efficiency and equity; and effects on allocative efficiency of the interactive relationship between, on the one hand, institutions designed specifically to inhibit free-riding, and on the other, broader social arrangements such as marriage customs or membership in a community, which create expectations of stable, ongoing relations between parties across a number of issue areas.

Key Words: co-management • collective action • common pool resources • institutional design

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 367-391 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003006


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