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What Rational Political Actors Can Expect

University of Georgia, bobgraf{at}arches.uga.edu

This article analyzes the distinction between two definitions of rationality, standard expected utility maximization and an alternative that says rational individuals maximize their expected utility given their acts. The latter version can explain important political phenomena that challenge the standard approach. Documenting the empirical advantages of the second definition for political science, the article also argues that conditional expected utility maximizers are normatively rational. Moreover, the article demonstrates that some important and recognized work in political science has unwittingly relied on this version’s underlying assumptions. Finally, it formally shows how this decision theory can ground equilibria in two-person games.

Key Words: conditional expected utility • rationality • turnout • voting

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2, 139-165 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400201


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