This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via ISI Web of Science (7) Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Braham, M. Articles by Holler, M. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index

braham{at}econ.uni-hamburg.de

Manfred J. Holler

University of Hamburg, holler{at}econ.uni-hamburg.de

This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic power indices on the basis of non-cooperative game theory. We argue that the criticism is unfounded and that a preference-based power index is incompatible with the definition of power as a generic ability: ‘the ability to affect outcomes’. We claim that power resides in, and only in, a game form and not in a game itself.

Key Words: ability • game theory • power indices • strategic power

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				S. Napel and M. Widgren The Possibility of a Preference-Based Power Index Journal of Theoretical Politics, July 1, 2005; 17(3): 377 - 387. [Abstract] [PDF]