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Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2, 217-247 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629805050861

A Formal Model of Delegation in the European Union

Fabio Franchino

School of Public Policy, University College London, f.franchino{at}ucl.ac.uk

This article develops a formal model of the politics of delegation in the European Union (EU) incorporating key institutional features: the legislative-executive role of the Commission, the legislative-executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to the Commission and increases its discretion. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in the case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision-making; and, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda-setting power.

Key Words: commitment • delegation • European Union • legislative procedures


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