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Journal of Theoretical Politics
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Structural Reform Litigation

Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift

Anthony M. Bertelli

Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, bertelli{at}uga.edu

Sven E. Feldmann

Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen

Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.

Key Words: agency • bargaining • bureaucratic drift • enforcement • public law

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 159-183 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629806061859
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