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Journal of Theoretical Politics
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Policy-Motivated Parties in Dynamic Political Competition

Oleg Smirnov

Department of Political Science, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA; osmirnov{at}miami.edu

James H. Fowler

Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, Social Sciences Building 383 #0521, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA; jhfowler{at}ucsd.edu

We analyze a model of a dynamic political competition between two policy-motivated parties under uncertainty. The model suggests that electoral mandates matter: increasing the margin of victory in the previous election causes both parties to shift towards policies preferred by the winner, and the loser typically shifts more than the winner. The model also provides potential answers to a number of empirical puzzles in the field of electoral politics. In particular, we provide possible explanations for why close elections may lead to extreme platforms by both parties, why increased extremism in the platform of one party may lead to greater moderation in the platform of the other party, and why increasing polarization of the electorate causes winning candidates to become more sensitive to mandates. We also show that, contrary to previous findings, increasing uncertainty sometimes decreases platform divergence. Finally, we pay special attention to the proper methodology for doing numerical comparative statics analysis in computational models.

Key Words: Bayesian updating • computational models • dynamic models • electoral politics • party competition

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 9-31 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807071014
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Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
J. H. Fowler and M. Laver
A Tournament of Party Decision Rules
Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 1, 2008; 52(1): 68 - 92.
[Abstract] [PDF]