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Journal of Theoretical Politics
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Justice Preferences and the Arrow Problem

Norman Frohlich

I. H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB/R3T 5V4, Canada, frohlic{at}ms.umanitoba.ca

Joe A. Oppenheimer

Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, USA, joppenheimer{at}gvpt.umd.edu

Arrow showed that there is no general way to aggregate non-interpersonally comparable preferences or welfare into either a sensible social choice or a social welfare measure. With majority rule the problem manifests itself as voting cycles. The standard response to this problem has been developing `spatial models' built on restricted preferences (or welfare). We develop an alternative family of solutions. By assuming a culturally accepted conception of justice within a utility function, we establish the possibility of sensible aggregate choice implementable via majority rule. Various assumptions regarding the form the utility function are discussed. Conditions for a Condorcet winner in a problem of pure redistribution are derived for a number of models. Some of the implications of this perspective for the theory of democracy are considered. Developing a normatively interesting social welfare function may require introducing normative concerns into the preferences of the individuals rather than just into the properties of the aggregation system.

Key Words: Arrow • Condorcet winner • justice • social welfare function • voting cycles

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, 363-390 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807080774
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