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The Messenger Game

Strategic Information Transmission Through Legislative Committees

School of Economics, University of Finance and Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, 200433, China, litaoonline{at}gmail.com

We challenge the generally accepted ally principle in legislative politics that a preference outlier committee will distort information to the legislative floor. If interest groups (or other third parties) are rational, they will withhold the most precise information for fear of committee misrepresentation. As a result, even preference outlier committees could be disciplined by their own ignorance not to distort the lobbyist message, as they are uncertain whether lying pays for the current situation or not. Our result calls into question the theoretical foundation of the influential preference outlier debate in legislative politics.

Key Words: cheap talk • committee system • informational lobbying • messenger

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, 489-501 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/09516298070190040501


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