Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Theoretical Politics
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Sharman, C.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Parliamentary Federations and Limited Government

Constitutional Design and Redesign in Australia and Canada

Campbell Sharman

Constitutional arrangements can be said to have a structural logic in the sense that, among other things, they reflect a pattern of assumptions about the nature of government and a polity's particular brand of constitutionalism. It is the argument of this article that there is a basic inconsistency in the constitutional design of parliamentary federations and particularly those which have incorporated British parliamentary traditions. This is illustrated by an analysis of the constitutional evolution of Australia and Canada. Both systems have responded to changing popular expectations of the scope and function of government not by gradual evolution within a consistent constitutional tradition, but by major alteration to the mode of constitutionalism as first one and then another element of the rival institutional logics becomes dominant. The tension between these competing elements is used to chart the interaction between federalism, parliamentary institutions and notions of limited government.

Key Words: federalism • parliamentary government • constitutional design • Australia • Canada

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 205-230 (1990)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692890002002004


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Party PoliticsHome page
T. Donovan
Mobilization and Support of Minor Parties: Australian Senate Elections
Party Politics, October 1, 2000; 6(4): 473 - 486.
[Abstract] [PDF]