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Getting a Poor Return

Courts, Justice and Governing Coalitions and the Audits of Low-Income Taxpayers

Department of Political Science, 38 Peachtree Centre Avenue, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA, polrmh{at}langate.gsu.edu

Many years ago Robert Dahl (1957) argued that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition and more recent scholarship has built on this argument. However, despite this, it is still a prevalent belief that courts protect the minority against the power of the majority. This article analyzes these views by examining the influence of the national coalition and courts on tax policy. The article shows that from 1994 through 2000 a shift to more low-income audits results from political and judicial influence on the agency. The dominant national political coalition, the Tax Court, and to a lesser extent the District Courts, are major players in setting and determining agency policy. This confirms what Dahl noted years ago, namely that the courts are rarely out of alignment with the dominant national political coalition, and actually enforce the policy preferences of the dominant political coalition.

Key Words: courts • IRS • justice • public policy • taxes

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 181-200 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085817


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