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Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation

Rochester Institute of Technology, aabgsh{at}rit.edu

Hamid Beladi

University of Texas in San Antonio, Hamid.Beladi{at}utsa.edu

Queuing mechanisms are commonly used in developing countries and in transition economies to allocate goods characterized by excess demand to citizens. Bribery and favoritism frequently accompany the use of such queuing mechanisms. Therefore, we first analyze a queuing model of resource allocation with bribery. Specifically, we determine the expected wait time of a citizen from the time he arrives to queue and the time he obtains the rationed good, the likelihood that a citizen illegally obtains n units of the rationed good, and the expected time a citizen spends being served by the public or private official. Next, we analyze a queuing model of resource allocation with favoritism. Using this model, we ascertain the mean arrival rate of the favored citizen and the likelihood that an ordinary citizen is bumped n times to provide the rationed good immediately to the favored citizen.

Key Words: bribery • corruption • favoritism • queuing theory • uncertainty

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