This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Google Scholar Articles by Kim, J. Articles by Rothenberg, L. S. Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

Foundations of Legislative Organization and Committee Influence

Korea Development Institute in its Department of Industrial and Corporate Affairs, jaehoonkim{at}kdi.re.kr

Lawrence S. Rothenberg

University of Rochester, lrot{at}mail.rochester.edu

We revisit seemingly settled questions of legislative organization, specifying a more general, realistic, informational model than previously. While theorists, unlike empiricists, have commonly inferred that the floor lacks incentive to allow committee influence via gatekeeping, we find otherwise. By assuming that (1) legislators know more about the status quo than alternative proposals, and (2) committee authority is endogenously determined, we show for numerous realizations of floor-committee preference divergence that vesting committees with agenda-setting power under an open rule is preferred to either an open rule without agenda setting or a closed rule. Net of a closed rule, when committees can receive status quo payoffs from inaction, their sending a message, particularly with monopoly agenda setting, frequently transmits more information than under a pure open rule. As such, many situations exist where the floor will not want to use majoritarian mechanisms, such as discharge petitions or non-germane amendment authority, even if the committee chooses inaction. Although for different reasons than postulated by distributive theorists, gatekeeping and related features such as deference norms are sustainable equilibrium phenomena.

Key Words: agenda setting • Congress • gatekeeping • legislative organisation • signaling

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?