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The Leader RuleA Model of Strategic Approval Voting in a Large ElectorateDepartment of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau, France, jean-francois.laslier{at}polytechnique.edu The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.
Key Words: Approval Voting Condorcet rationality sincerity strategic
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1,
113-136 (2009) |
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