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Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?

Tippie College of Business at the University of Iowa, dan-kovenock{at}uiowa.edu

Brian Roberson

Farmer School of Business at Miami University, robersba{at}muohio.edu

In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This article investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a hybrid strategy in which non-battleground states are stochastically targeted.

Key Words: all-pay auction • dynamic contests • elections • political campaigns • war of attrition

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 213-236 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629808100764


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