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Successful and Failed Screening Mechanisms in the Two Gulf Wars

Department of Political Science at the Ohio-State University, verdier.2{at}polisci.osu.edu

The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats — screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce threats and promises, and restricted opportunities for moral hazard. The model's predictions are then tested on two most similar cases — the two Gulf wars — with collective learning taking place during the former but not the latter. The paired comparison suggests that rather than being misinformed or irrational, Saddam, in 2003, was not offered the kinds of incentives that would have led him to reveal the truth about the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

Key Words: Gulf War • international sanction • screening mechanism

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 311-342 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629809103966


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