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Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional Representation

University of Virginia, dwg4c{at}virginia.edu

What is the relationship between ballot structure (the manner in which citizens cast their votes) and corruption related to the financing of politics? The author develops a principal agent—model which considers how differences in ballot structure may facilitate or impede attempts by parties to utilize the public administration as a source of electoral resources. Electoral systems which concentrate political career control in the hands of party leaders, such as closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) facilitate the use of the bureaucracy in this manner, whereas electoral systems that undermine party leader control, such as preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR), make it more difficult. The difference in the two systems rests with the degree of leverage enjoyed by party leaders vis-à-vis politically oriented bureaucrats. The capacity for favoritism under CLPR permits party leaders to reward militants who have engaged in risky behavior for the party; PLPR undercuts similar attempts to reward risky behavior.

Key Words: bureaucracy • corruption • electoral rules • formal theory • Latin America

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, 509-541 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629809339805


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