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Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of ComplexityThis paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n-person games, discussion focuses on the conditions under which corporate actors and coalitions, as well as collective and even aggregate actors, may be legitimately treated as unitary players. In addition, the importance of functional differentiation and ingroup-outgroup segmentation for the segregation of game-like interactions is explored.
Key Words: composite actors corporate actors distrust functional differentiation game theory
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3,
277-304 (1991) This article has been cited by other articles:
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