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Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems
Elinor Ostrom
In their article in this issue, Singleton and Taylor ask why some groups of users of a commons are able to resolve their collective action problems on their own and others are not. They argue that when groups approximate a community of mutually vulnerable individuals, they are able to develop endogenous solutions. In this note, I discuss four questions: (1) Is community important for the solution of CPR problems? (2) Is community sufficient for the solution of CPR problems? (3) Is community necessary for the solution of CPR problems? and (4) Are solutions to CPR problems robust over the long-run without enforcers?
Key Words: community self-organization common-pool resource
Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4, No. 3,
343-351 (1992)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004003006

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