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Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Two different models of the game between police and public, one with two-sided incomplete information and the other with multiple strategies, lead to the same results as my previous research: changes in penalties at equilibrium do not affect crime but instead affect police behavior. I compare these models with alternative models of the police-public game which come to different conclusions. I provide reasons for the differences in the conclusions, as well as empirical evidence against which the different models can be evaluated.

Key Words: crime • game theory • penalty

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 349-374 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005003003


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				L. Franckx Penalty and Crime with Lumpy Choices: Some Further Considerations Journal of Theoretical Politics, October 1, 2004; 16(4): 403 - 421. [Abstract] [PDF]

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