This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Frohlich, N. Articles by Oppenheimer, J. A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Justice Preferences and the Arrow Problem

I. H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB/R3T 5V4, Canada, frohlic{at}ms.umanitoba.ca

Joe A. Oppenheimer

Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, USA, joppenheimer{at}gvpt.umd.edu

Arrow showed that there is no general way to aggregate non-interpersonally comparable preferences or welfare into either a sensible social choice or a social welfare measure. With majority rule the problem manifests itself as voting cycles. The standard response to this problem has been developing `spatial models' built on restricted preferences (or welfare). We develop an alternative family of solutions. By assuming a culturally accepted conception of justice within a utility function, we establish the possibility of sensible aggregate choice implementable via majority rule. Various assumptions regarding the form the utility function are discussed. Conditions for a Condorcet winner in a problem of pure redistribution are derived for a number of models. Some of the implications of this perspective for the theory of democracy are considered. Developing a normatively interesting social welfare function may require introducing normative concerns into the preferences of the individuals rather than just into the properties of the aggregation system.

Key Words: Arrow • Condorcet winner • justice • social welfare function • voting cycles

References

• Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd edn). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
• Arrow, Kenneth J. (1977) `Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice', American Economic Review 67: 219—25.[Web of Science]
• Black, Duncan (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Bolton, Gary E. (1991) `A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence', American Economic Review 81(5): 1096—136.[Web of Science]
• Bolton, Gary E. and Rami Zwick (1995) `Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining ', Games and Economic Behavior 10: 95—121.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Braybrooke, David (1987) Meeting Needs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Brock, Gillian (2005) `Needs and Global Justice', in Soran Reader (ed.) The Philsophy of Need, pp. 51—72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Cain, Michael (1998) `An Experimental Investigation of Motives and Information in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game', in John Skvoretz and Jacek Szmatka (eds) Advances in Group Processes, pp. 133—60. New York: JAI Press.
• Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin (2000) `Some Simple Tests of Social Preferences'. Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley.
• Coughlin, Peter (1988) `Expectations about Voter Choices', Public Choice 44(1): 49—59.[CrossRef]
• Cox, James C. Klarita Sadiraj and Vjollca Sadiraj (2001) `A Theory of Competition and Fairness without Inequity Aversion'. Paper presented at the International Meetings of the Economics Society of America, Barcelona, Spain, June.
• De la Cruz-Dosa, Rena and Alan Martina (2000) `Diverse Groups Agreeing on a System of Justice and Distribution: Evidence From the Philippines', Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 11: 35—76.
• Doyle, Len and Ian Gough (1991) A Theory of Human Need. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
• Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003) `Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation', British Journal of Political Science 33: 1—28.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999) `A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation', Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(August): 817—68.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Fishkin, James S. and Peter Laslett (2003) Debating Deliberative Democracy. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
• Frohlich, Norman (1974) `Self-interest or Altruism: What Difference?', Journal of Conflict Resolution 18: 55—73.[Abstract]
• Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1992) Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (2000) `Choosing: A Cognitive Model of Economic and Political Decision Making'. Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society, March, Charleston, USA.
• Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (2001) `Choosing from a Moral Point of View', Interdisciplinary Economics 12: 89—115.
• Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (2003) `Optimal Policies and Socially Oriented Behavior: Some Problematic Effects of an Incentive Compatible Device ', Public Choice 117(3/4): 273—93.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer and Anja Kurki (2004) `Modeling Other-regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test', Public Choice 119(1/2): 91—117.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Fung, Archon and Erik Olin Wright (eds) (2003) Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Real Utopias Project). New York: Verso.
• Goldfinger, Johnny (2002) `The Value of Social Choice Theory for Normative Political Theorists', The Good Society 2: 33—7.
• Guttman, Amy and Dennis Thompson (2002) `Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process', Journal of Political Philosophy 10(2): 153—74.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Harsanyi, John C. (1953) `Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking', Journal of Political Economy 61: 434—5.[CrossRef]
• Jackson, Michael and Peter Hill (1995) `A Fair Share', Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 69—79.
• Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1982) `The Psychology of Preferences', Scientific American 246: 160—73.[Web of Science]
• Knight, Jack and James Johnson (1994) `Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy', Political Theory 22(2): 277—96.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Konow, James (1996) `A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 31(1): 15—35.
• Konow, James (2000) `Fair Shares and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions', American Economic Review 90(4): 1072—91.[Web of Science]
• Larrick, Richard P. and Sally Blount (1997) `The Claiming Effect: Why Players Are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in Ultimatum Games', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72: 810—25.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
• Luce, Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957/1985) Games and Decisions. New York: Dover.
• Mackie, Gerry (2003) Democracy Defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Merton, Robert K. (1967) On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays, Old and New. New York: Macmillan/ Free Press.
• Miller, David (1991/2002) `Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', in David Estlund (ed.) Democracy, pp. 289—307. Oxford: Blackwell.
• Miller, David (1999) Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Mueller, Dennis C. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Nagel, Thomas (1986) The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Nagel, Thomas (1991) Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
• Oleson, Paul E. (1997) `An Experimental Examination of Alternative Theories of Distributive Justice and Economic Fairness'. Paper presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, San Francisco.
• Olson, Mancur (1990) How Bright Are the Northern Lights? Some Questions About Sweden. Lund: Institute of Economic Research, Lund University.
• Olson, Mancur (1993) `Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', American Political Science Review 87: 567—76.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992) `Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-governance is Possible', American Political Science Review 86: 404—17.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Postrel, Virginia (2003) `Looking Inside the Brains of the Stingy and the Openhanded', The New York Times, 27 February.
• Rabin, Matthew (1993) `Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics', American Economic Review 83: 1281—302.[Web of Science]
• Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiy Press.
• Riker, William H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press
• Roth, Alvin, E. (1995) `Bargaining Experiments', in John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth (eds) The Handbook of Experimental Economics, pp. 253—342. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, Shusuke Takahashi and Stephen Turnbull (1996) `Justice in Income Distribution: An Experimental Approach'. Paper presented at the 1996 ISA conference, San Diego.
• Schotter, Andrew (1984) Free Market Economics: A Critical Appraisal. New York: St. Martin's Press.
• Sen, A.K. (1973) On Economic Inequality. New York: Norton.
• Sen, A.K. (2002) Freedom and Social Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek (1997) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. New York: Norton.
• Thurow, Lester (1971) `The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good ', Quarterly Journal of Economics 85: 327—36.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
• Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981) `The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice', Science 221: 453—8.[CrossRef]
• Wilkinson, Richard G. (1997) `Income Inequality Summarizes the Health Burden of Individual Relative Deprivation', British Medical Journal 314: 1727—8.[Free Full Text]
• Wittman, Donald (2003) `When Does Altruism Overcome the Intransitivity of Income Distribution?', in Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe (eds) Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, 363-390 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807080774


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Frohlich, N. Articles by Oppenheimer, J. A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?