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Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 33-48 (1989)
DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001001003

Democratic Political Systems

Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences

Arend Lijphart

The two dimensions of the majoritarian-consensus typology are based on (1) characteristics of the party system, electroal system and government coalitions, and (2) federal vs. unitary traits. Consensus democracy and the earlier concept of consociational democracy overlap considerably, but they differ in the degree to which they focus on formal institutions vs. informal practices. Moreover, consociationalism is the more suitable prescription for very deeply divided societies. With only a few minor doubts, the 22 cases of long-term democracy fit the majoritarian-consensus typology well. There are three causal explanations for the placement of the cases in the typology: the degree to which the countries are plural societies, population size and the influence of the Westminster model. Contrary to the conventional view, the evidence further shows that majoritarian democracy cannot be regarded as superior to consensus democracy in terms of their respective consequences for democratic stability and quality.

Key Words: democracy • typologies • consensus • consociationalism • majoritarianism


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