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Source:2016 Release of Journal Citation Reports, Source: 2015 Web of Science Data

Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries

  1. Patrick Hummel
  1. Google Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA
  1. Patrick Hummel, Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. Email: phummel{at}google.com

Abstract

I present a model in which a nation must decide whether to reveal its military capacity when the nation faces two possible adversaries. One adversary would be inclined to attack if the country has a weak military capacity, and the other adversary would be inclined to attack preemptively if the country is developing a strong military capacity. I derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium for the nation to be ambiguous about its military capacity as a function of the hawkishness of the adversaries and the accuracy of the adversaries’ national intelligence.

Article Notes

  • Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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This Article

  1. Journal of Theoretical Politics vol. 27 no. 2 288-300
    All Versions of this Article:
    1. current version image indicatorVersion of Record - Apr 7, 2015
    2. OnlineFirst Version of Record - May 18, 2014
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