Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries
- Patrick Hummel, Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. Email: phummel{at}google.com
Abstract
I present a model in which a nation must decide whether to reveal its military capacity when the nation faces two possible adversaries. One adversary would be inclined to attack if the country has a weak military capacity, and the other adversary would be inclined to attack preemptively if the country is developing a strong military capacity. I derive conditions under which it is an equilibrium for the nation to be ambiguous about its military capacity as a function of the hawkishness of the adversaries and the accuracy of the adversaries’ national intelligence.
Article Notes
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Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
- © The Author(s) 2014












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