Journal of Theoretical Politics current issue

Nominations for Sale

Console-Battilana, S., Shepsle, K. A. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:19:40 PDT

Models of nomination politics in the USA often find ‘gridlock’ in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present article we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee.

The Puzzle of Weak Pocketbook Voting

Grafstein, R. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:19:40 PDT

This article investigates why predominantly self-interested voters exhibit weak pocketbook voting. Focusing on the USA, it estimates partisan government’s impact on household income and, based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis, models the conversion of that income into consumption, the source of voters’ utility in the model. The analysis implies that pocketbook voting is weak because anticipated policy is already incorporated in household consumption plans. Sociotropic variables are more powerful because they determine the relative value of partisan policies in the longer term. Using PSID data, estimates of the US parties’ impact on income generate a measure of partisan utility differences. This measure enters into a probit analysis using 1952—2000 ANES presidential election data. The pocketbook measure performs as predicted both independently and in relation to sociotropic variables.

Trust in the Balance: Asymmetric Information, Commitment Problems and Balancing Behavior

Savic, I., Shirkey, Z. C. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:19:40 PDT

Realists argue that balancing occurs in response to changes to the balance of power. Recent informational approaches have focused primarily on informational asymmetries or commitment problems. The article combines these two approaches and builds on them by incorporating characteristics of the revisionist state and the potential balancer, as well as the specific challenge to the balance of power. The model confirms that informational asymmetries often lead to commitment problems, which are a necessary condition for balancing. However, whether or not informational asymmetries create commitment problems depends on both the nature of the challenger’s move and the relative power of the challenger and respondent. The article shows under what conditions balancing is likely to occur and, counter-intuitively, that less revisionist challengers are often more willing to risk being balanced against than are more aggressive challengers.

Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional Representation

Gingerich, D. W. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:19:40 PDT

What is the relationship between ballot structure (the manner in which citizens cast their votes) and corruption related to the financing of politics? The author develops a principal agent—model which considers how differences in ballot structure may facilitate or impede attempts by parties to utilize the public administration as a source of electoral resources. Electoral systems which concentrate political career control in the hands of party leaders, such as closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) facilitate the use of the bureaucracy in this manner, whereas electoral systems that undermine party leader control, such as preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR), make it more difficult. The difference in the two systems rests with the degree of leverage enjoyed by party leaders vis-à-vis politically oriented bureaucrats. The capacity for favoritism under CLPR permits party leaders to reward militants who have engaged in risky behavior for the party; PLPR undercuts similar attempts to reward risky behavior.

Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in Eu Treaty Negotiations

Finke, D. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 07:19:40 PDT

This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states’ positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states’ positions at the IGC 2003—4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.